Employment Cases

Employment law is always changing and the attorneys of the Law Offices of Steven M. Ziegler are diligently staying on top of changes in the law to minimize the risk to our clients.  Listed below are recent employment decisions as reported in Health Law Digest, a publication of the American Health Lawyers Association:

Employee Who Failed to Provide Doctor's Diagnosis or Prognosis May Be Fired

The appeals court upheld a district court decision that an employee who failed to provide adequate and timely notice to his employer of his need for - and the likely duration of - sick leave "did not trigger [the employer's] obligations and duties under the FMLA, and the termination of his employment was not violative of the" act. Gary Peeples, who suffered from depression, refused to give his employer sufficient information for it to decide whether his time away from work was FMLA-qualifying. Peeples had been working for Coastal for about five years when he left work to see his doctor, who told him to go to the emergency room, where a psychiatrist prescribed two anti-depressant medications and told the worker to stay home for a week. A few days later, Peeples called his supervisor and said he was "hoping to return to work" but did not know when. Peeples gave Coastal doctor's notes explaining that he needed leave, but none contained a diagnosis, so the company eventually fired him. The appeals court noted that Coastal "was utterly incapable of making a preliminary determination as to whether Peeples' absence was justified. . . because Peeples and his doctor were providing incomplete responses, indeed, dishonest responses, to [Coastal's] informal requests for information." The circuit court upheld the grant of summary judgment to the employer.

Peeples v. Coastal Office Prods. Inc., No. 02-1848 (4th Cir. 2003)

Supreme Court Rules State Workers May Sue States Under FMLA

A 6-3 majority of the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals decision that state workers have the right to sue their employers under the FMLA. The decision was based on a suit for alleged FMLA violations filed by an employee of Nevada's Department of Human Resources. The Supreme Court's ruling, written by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, held that Congress had the authority to remedy past gender discrimination by mandating 12 weeks of unpaid leave for state employees to care for newborn or adopted children, seriously ill family members or themselves. The Court found ample evidence of past gender discrimination against men as well as women in employment when family responsibilities conflicted with work and led Congress to adopt the FMLA. For example, in 1991, 15 states provided women up to one year of extended maternity leave, while only four provided men the same time off. "This and other differential leave policies were not attributable to any differential physical needs of men and women, but rather to the pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family members is women's work," the Court said. By enacting the FMLA, Congress "sought to ensure that family-care leave would no longer be stigmatized as an inordinate drain on the workplace by female employees, and that employers could not evade leave obligations simply by hiring men."

Nevada Department of Human Res. v. Hibbs, U.S., No. 01-1368, May 27, 2003

Eleventh Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment For Employer, Holds Employee Failed To Establish Prima Facie Case Of Discrimination

In 1996, Alma Knight, an African-American, was hired to work as a nurse by Baptist Hospital of Miami Inc. (Baptist). Baptist has a four-step disciplinary process of informal discussions, discussion and a formal written agreement, decision-making leave, and termination. Based on an incident in which Knight was rude and disrespectful to two other employees, she was given decision-making leave on May 9, 2000, in which she was to determine if she still wanted to work for Baptist. The leave was based on the incident, but also on Knight's disciplinary history. The disciplinary history included several documented performance issues for which Knight had been counseled under the first two steps of the disciplinary process. As part of the decision-making leave, Knight was required to submit an "action plan" for resolving the noted deficiencies. On May 11, Knight turned in an action plan, which failed to address her behavior problems. Knight was told to address the issue in a second action plan, but she missed the deadline. On May 22, Knight submitted the second action plan, but she only restated the incident. On May 23, 2000, Knight was terminated. Knight filed a grievance, and her termination was upheld.

Knight sued Baptist in federal district court, alleging she was the victim of disparate treatment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq., and the Florida Civil Rights Act. Baptist moved for summary judgment on the ground Knight had not established a prima facie case of discrimination because she failed to identify a similarly situated person from a different class who was treated more favorably. Knight contended in her response that Jean Arnold, a Caucasian nurse at Baptist, had similar performance problems but was not severely disciplined. The court granted Baptist's motion on the ground Knight and Arnold were not similarly situated. Knight appealed.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The appeals court noted Baptist conceded that Knight proved some of the elements of a prima facie case, including that she was a member of a minority, that she was subject to an adverse employment action, and that she was qualified for her job. However, Baptist argued Knight failed to show that similarly situated employees of other races were treated better than her. Knight argued Arnold was treated more favorably because Arnold committed similar acts of misconduct and was not placed on decision-making leave. Review of the work records of Knight and Arnold revealed they were not similarly situated, said the appeals court. The appeals court found that Knight's performance history was "substantially worse than Arnold's." Knight was documented for several instances of failing to follow procedures and she failed to improve her performance following counseling. Like Knight, Arnold had absenteeism and tardiness problems, but the record showed that Arnold's performance gradually improved after she received counseling. Arnold also only failed to follow procedures on two occasions. The appeals court determined that in light of the record, Knight and Arnold were not similarly situated, and the fact Arnold was not placed on decision-making leave did not create an inference of discrimination against Knight. Accordingly, the appeals court affirmed the district court's summary judgment for Baptist.

A dissenting opinion said that drawing a reasonable inference in Knight's favor, a reasonable jury could have found Knight and Arnold were similarly situated.

Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, No. 02-10861 (11th Cir. May 14, 2003)

Fifth Circuit Says EEOC Provided Sufficient Evidence Of Employer's Discrimination In Not Offering Health Benefits To Employee

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), on behalf of Leticia Gonzalez, sued Gonzalez's employer, Dunbar Diagnostic Services, Inc. (Dunbar), on claims of discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The district court granted Dunbar's motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on both claims, and the EEOC appealed.

The Fifth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, reversed the district court's judgment. The appeals court concluded the EEOC had established a prima facie case of discrimination that was sufficient to preclude JMOL. The EEOC established the prima facie case by showing that Gonzalez was a member of a protected class, that she was qualified for the health insurance benefits that her employer offered, and that the benefits were denied to her but were offered to other employees of Dunbar. The EEOC also provided evidence that Dunbar's claim that it did not provide benefits to Gonzalez because she did not ask for them was false. Therefore, the appeals court held the grant of JMOL on the discrimination claim was improper.

The appeals court then turned to the EEOC's claim that Dunbar had terminated Gonzalez in retaliation for her filing a discrimination charge. The appeals court determined that Gonzalez had engaged in a protected activity when she filed the discrimination charge, and the EEOC produced sufficient evidence to show that Gonzalez suffered an adverse employment action when she was terminated for filing the complaint. The appeals court rejected Dunbar's argument that Gonzalez was not qualified for her job and thus could not recover for retaliation. According to the appeals court, a temporary medical leave did not disqualify Gonzalez from doing her job. Concluding that the EEOC had raised a genuine issue of fact on both issues, the appeals court remanded the case for a jury to consider the evidence.

Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Dunbar Diagnostic Servs., Inc., Nos. 03-20292 and 03-20500, 2004 WL 326847 (5th Cir. Feb. 19, 2004)

Eleventh Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment For Employer Finding Misconduct In Discrimination Suit Must Be "Nearly Identical"

Plaintiff-appellant Dr. Brian Morris, an obstetrician and gynecologist, was appointed to the Emory University School of Medicine faculty as an assistant professor in 1995. His employment at defendant-appellee, Emory Clinic, Inc. (Clinic), was subject to termination for any reason upon ninety days written notice. In 2000, Morris received a series of patient complaints. Later that year, a patient wrote a letter complaining about Morris. In April 2001, another patient complained about Morris, characterizing his treatment of her as "degrading."

In May 2001, Morris was placed on an administrative leave of absence (with pay) and understood that this action was taken so that the Clinic could conduct an investigation into the complaints. After the investigation, the supervisor offered Morris the option of resigning rather than having the Clinic terminate him; Morris opted not to resign. Morris was sent a letter dated May 25, 2001, providing him with ninety days notice of his termination pursuant to the employment agreement. Morris was to be terminated effective August 23, 2001, but would remain on administrative leave with pay until that time.

After his termination, Morris sued the Clinic for employment discrimination under federal and state law including Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), contending that the Clinic discriminated against him on the basis of age and sex when it terminated his employment and hired a younger female. He also avers that the Clinic responded more aggressively to patient complaints against him because he was an older male than it did to similar complaints against younger female physicians. The complaints he identified, however, generally involved administrative failures (e.g., failure to return phone calls, lack of promptness in examining a patient, difficulty in obtaining an appointment) or allegations of negligence in connection with a medical procedure. The district court granted summary judgment for the Clinic. Morris appealed.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Morris' employment discrimination claim was without merit. Morris had no evidence that age or sex played any role in the Clinic's decision to terminate his employment. The appeals court also noted that Morris failed to identify a female physician who received similar complaints concerning remarks made or who was accused of conducting forceful physical examinations who was not terminated (or received favorable treatment). Without showing that a comparable female received "nearly identical" complaints, the court could not adequately compare the Clinic's actions toward Morris and other female physicians.

Accordingly, the appeals court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Clinic.

Morris v. Emory Clinic, Inc., No. 04-15090 (11th Cir. Mar. 8, 2005)